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ABSTRACT
We present a transparency-enhancing tool in the form of
a cryptographic scheme that enables data processors to in-
form users about the actual data processing that takes place
on their personal data. Our proposed solution can han-
dle arbitrary processes while offloading storage and interac-
tions with users to dedicated log servers. On top of strong
integrity and confidentiality properties, our scheme takes
users’ privacy one step further by making it impossible to
link multiple log entries for the same user or user identifiers
across multiple data processors (for distributed processes).
Our proposed solution has several applications, e.g., it can
make access to electronic health records transparent to the
patients to whom the records relate. Furthermore, we are
the first to formalise the required security and privacy prop-
erties in this setting in a general manner (not specifically for
our scheme) and prove that our scheme fulfils these. Finally,
we show that our scheme is applicable in practice, providing
performance results for a prototype implementation.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6 [Software]: Security and Protection—Cryptographic
controls; E.3 [Data]: Data Encryption—Public key cryp-
tosystems
Keywords
Transparency-enhancing tool, privacy, distributed, applied
cryptography, data processing
1. INTRODUCTION
Transparency of data processing is often a requirement for
compliance to legislation and/or business requirements: e.g.,
keeping access logs to electronic health records (EHR), gen-
erating bookkeeping records or logging data to black boxes.
Furthermore, transparency is recognised as a key privacy
principle, e.g., in the EU Data Protection Directive (DPD)
95/46/EC Articles 7, 10, and 11; and in the Swedish Patient
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Data Act (“Patientdatalagen”) SFS (2008:355) that states
that patients have the right to see who has accessed their
EHR. In general, increased transparency of data process-
ing may increase the end-users’ trust in the data processor1,
especially if the data processing is distributed as in cloud
computing [12]. Other applications can be found in eGov-
ernment services, where enhanced transparency towards cit-
izens is a key element [22].
Beyond technical considerations of what to make transpar-
ent to whom to accurately represent data processing, there
are a number of social and economic issues that need to be
taken into account when determining what is an adequate
level of transparency. As recognised in recital 41 of the EU
DPD, too detailed descriptions of data processing may reveal
business-sensitive information of the data processors, such as
trade secrets. Furthermore, employees of the data processor
may experience the requirement of transparency as a breach
of their own privacy [17]. The work presented in this paper
is agnostic to what information is made transparent. We
focus on ensuring that only the user whose personal data is
being processed can read the logged information. This con-
servative approach ensures the end-users’ privacy. In gen-
eral, sharing information is easier than removing access to
information that has already been provided to a party. Our
approach has the added benefit of reducing the negative ef-
fects of transparency on the employees of the data processor,
since their actions are only made transparent towards the
user whose data they are processing. E.g., the logs cannot
be misused to monitor the employees’ performance.
Information about how data will be processed by data
processors is usually represented by a privacy policy that
states what data is requested for which purpose, whether
the data will be forwarded to third-parties, how long the
data will be retained, and so on. A privacy policy informs
the potential user before any data is disclosed, so that a
user can give informed consent to the data processing by
the service provider. Our approach enables data processors
to inform users about the actual data processing that occurs
after users have disclosed data, taking the privacy of users
into account. Conceptually, access to this information en-
ables a user to verify that the actions of the data processor
are in line with the privacy policy2.
1We opt for the technical terminology of data processor and
user, as opposed to the EU DPD that uses a more formal
terminology (including data controller, data subject, . . . ).
2Assuming that (1) the semantics of the privacy policy and
information provided to the user allow reasonable compari-
Our tool allows a data processor to use a set of log servers,
creating log entries that describe how the user’s data has
been processed. Users can then, at their own discretion,
query these logs to learn of the data processing performed on
their disclosed data. Figure 1 illustrates this setting between
a user Alice and data processor Bob. Alice discloses some
data to Bob under a privacy policy. While Bob is processing
Alice’s data, Bob generates log entries at a log server that
records the processing. Alice can later retrieve the log entries
that contain the description of data processing and verify if
Bob’s actions are in line with his privacy policy.
Figure 1: High-level overview of our transparency-
enhancing tool’s usage.
The simple setting illustrated in Figure 1 is missing one
important aspect of data processing: data processing is of-
ten distributed. Data concerning users may be shared by the
data processor, or other data processors may be used by the
initial data processor. We denote the actions, performed
by a set of data processors, for a particular task, a pro-
cess. Figure 2 illustrates a setting for a process (solid lines)
where Alice discloses data to Bob, the initial data processor.
Bob then shares (part of) Alice’s data with the downstream
data processor Charlie, who in turn shares (part of) Alice’s
data with data processors Dave and Eve. While data pro-
cessors Bob, Charlie, Dave, and Eve process Alice’s data,
all of them continuously log descriptions of their processing
(dashed lines) to their, potentially different, log servers. Al-
ice can later reconstruct the log trail of the data processing
on her data.
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Figure 2: Data processing is often distributed,
where data disclosed by a user Alice may be shared
by the initial data processor Bob with other data
processors Charlie, Dave, and Eve. Downstream
data processing of Alice’s data should also be logged.
son, and (2) that the information provided by the data pro-
cessor is complete (see Section 3.1).
In the case of an EHR system, in Figure 2, Alice could be
the patient and Bob, Charlie, Dave, and Eve medical journal
systems at one or more medical institutions. All access by
medical staff to Alice’s medical records will be logged such
that Alice can later see who has read her medical records.
Because log entries contain descriptions of data process-
ing on personal data, the log entries themselves also contain
personal data. Therefore, when implementing such a log sys-
tem, there are several privacy and security issues that need
to be addressed. Returning to the EHR example, knowing
who has accessed a person’s medical records is sensitive in-
formation. In fact, even knowing that a person has been
treated at a particular medical institution may be sensitive.
In other words, not only the content of the log entries but
also the fact that log entries exist for a certain individual
is sensitive information. Furthermore, imagine the case of
medical personnel illegitimately accessing EHRs. In such a
case, the offenders are also likely to attempt to cover the
traces of their actions, for example by deleting the gener-
ated log entries. Therefore, alterations to log entries need
to be detectable once they have been constructed. Similar
arguments can be made for the case of business-sensitive
information being logged for a company.
Our contributions are as follows: we present a transparency-
enhancing tool in the form of a cryptographic scheme for
distributed transparency logging of data processing while
preserving the privacy of users. Our scheme can handle ar-
bitrary processes while offloading storage and interactions
with users to dedicated log servers. Compared to earlier re-
lated work, our scheme is the first to define and formally
prove several privacy properties in this setting. We also
present a performance evaluation of a prototype implemen-
tation, showing that our scheme is feasible.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows.
Section 2 discusses related work. Section 3 presents our gen-
eral model and definitions. This is followed in Section 4 by
a thorough explanation of our scheme. Section 5 evaluates
the scheme’s security and privacy properties. We present a
performance evaluation of our prototype implementation in
Section 6. Finally, Section 7 provides concluding remarks.
2. RELATED WORK
Sackmann et al. [18] presented the earliest work on provid-
ing transparency of data processing by using cryptographic
systems from the secure logging area. Trusted auditors use
secure logs of data processing as so called “privacy evidence”
to compare the actual processing with the processing stated
in a privacy policy that users have consented to. Wouters
et al. [24] and Hedbom et al. [9] tackle privacy issues in
a setting with one key difference from the work of Sack-
mann et al.: users take on the primary role of auditors of
the logged data that relates to them, arguably removing
the need for trusted auditors. This change of setting is the
primary source of potential threats to the privacy of users
(ignoring the content of log entries), since log entries now
relate to different users who are actively participating in the
scheme. These threats are primarily due to the linkability of
entries to users and user identifiers between logs. Wouters
et al. address the linkability issue between logs on different
log servers in a distributed setting, while Hedbom et al. ad-
dress linkability between log entries in one log. The scheme
we propose in this paper addresses several issues in prior
work, such as truncation attacks (described briefly later) or
partial linkability of log entries. Furthermore, we propose
generalised notions of security and privacy in this setting
and prove that our scheme fulfils these notions. Finally, we
provide implementation results on our scheme.
Note that our work, like [9, 18], builds upon concepts from
the secure logging system by Schneier and Kelsey [19]. A
thorough review of related work in the secure logging area is
given in a technical report by Pulls et al. [16] together with a
preliminary informal version of the scheme presented in this
paper. For this preliminary version, it was shown by Vliegen
et al. [23] how it could be strengthened by adding trusted
hardware. Finally, Peeters et al. [15] present a high-level
description of our scheme.
3. OUR MODEL
This section first provides an overview of the setting and
our adversary model within the setting. Next, we present
high-level requirements that are then formalised.
3.1 Setting and Adversary Model
Figure 3 depicts a very simple distributed process. As
processing is taking place for Alice’s data, Bob continuously
sends data describing the data processing to its log server
that turns the data into log entries for Alice. Each log en-
try at a log server concerns one user. At some point in
time, Bob wishes to fork the process to a downstream data
processor Dave. When a process forks, the user is not in-
volved, yet transparency logging of data processing should
continue, potentially to a different log server. We allow the
structure of the process to be dynamic, meaning that the
structure of the process is not necessarily predetermined.
When Alice disclosed her data to Bob, neither Alice nor Bob
needed to be aware of the fact that Bob would later share
Alice’s data with Dave. To realise this, we store metadata
in the user’s log when a fork takes place that enables the
user to follow each fork in the process. In this case, when
Bob shared the data with Dave, he logged some metadata
for Alice. The exact structure of this metadata is later pre-
sented in Section 4.5. All of these log entries with metadata,
spread across different log servers, form a log trail between
log servers that only the user can reconstruct.
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Figure 3: Setting for user Alice, data processor Bob,
and downstream data processor Dave.
We consider the properties provided by the scheme for log
entries that are committed prior to compromise of one or
more log servers and/or data processors. The users are fully
trusted. In other words, we initially trust all entities in the
scheme up to a point in time t when an adversary compro-
mises one or more log servers and/or data processors. This is
the standard adversary model within the secure logging area
[2, 11, 13, 19, 25]. Log servers keep some state information,
apart from the storage needed for the log entries themselves.
When a log server is compromised, the adversary has full ac-
cess to its internal state and storage. Our goal is to achieve
strong cryptographic properties for all created log entries,
and the metadata kept to create them (state), before t.
We argue that assuming initial trust in a data processor is
reasonable, since without (some degree of) initial trust, the
user will not disclose data to the data processor in the first
place. Assuming that the data processor is trustworthy, its
automated data processing should be setup to automatically
log data processing through our tool. When the data pro-
cessor becomes compromised, either by an external party or
by an insider such as an employee, all descriptions of data
processing that have been made up to that point should
fulfill the requirements outlined in the following sections.
Once compromised, little guarantee can be given about fu-
ture processing. For log servers, the required initial trust
can be minimised by introducing trusted hardware at the
log server, e.g., as described by Vliegen et al. [23]. We also
stress that auditability is an important property of a logging
scheme, since the relationship between the log server and the
data processor is a fragile one: the data processor trusts the
log server to log as instructed, for the correct user, while the
log server trusts the data processor to encrypt for the cor-
rect user. However, both trusted hardware and auditability
are outside the scope of this paper.
For communication, we assume secure channels between
all entities. Furthermore, between users and log servers we
assume an anonymous channel.
3.2 Requirements
We present four high-level requirements for our scheme
and briefly motivate why they are important in our setting.
In Section 3.4, these are formally defined and in Section 5 we
prove that the scheme presented in Section 4 realises these.
R1 The adversary should not be able to make undetectable
modifications to logged data (committed prior to com-
promise), i.e., the integrity of the data should be en-
sured once stored.
R2 Only the user should be able to read the data logged
for him, i.e., the data should be confidential (secrecy).
R3 From the log and the state, it should not be possible for
an adversary to determine if two log entries (commit-
ted prior to compromise) are related to the same user
or not, i.e., user log entries should be unlinkable.
R4 User identifiers (setup prior to compromise) across mul-
tiple data processors or log servers should be unlink-
able.
R1 and R2 are the basic notions of forward integrity and se-
crecy/confidentiality, from the secure logging area, ensuring
that logged data cannot be modified or read by an adversary.
R3 and R4 emerge primarily as a consequence of our setting,
where having multiple recipients of logged data leads to the
need to protect the privacy of the recipient users. R3 pro-
tects the privacy of the user by preventing log entries from
being linked to a particular user. If log entries could be
linked together, patterns on log trails can reveal sensitive
information. For example, the number of log entries in a
trail can serve as a unique fingerprint of an event, generat-
ing a link to a data processor or a user. R4 removes the
links between each step (fork) in the process.
3.3 Notation
We denote the security parameter as k ∈ N. A function
f : N→ R is ‘polynomial’ in k if f(k) = O(kn), with n ∈ N.
A function is ‘negligible’ if, for every c ∈ N there exists an
integer kc such that f(k) ≤ k−c for all k > kc. We denote
a negligible function by (k). Oracle(args)→ response de-
notes an algorithm or oracle with input args that outputs
response. An adversary A that outputs response after mak-
ing an arbitrary number of queries (in arbitrary order) to the
listed oracles is denoted as response← Aoracle1,oracle2,oracle3().
ExppropertyA (k) is the experiment (in the security parameter
k) that the challenger sets up for an adversary A against
property property. AdvpropertyA (k) is the advantage of the
adversary in breaking property property (for a given secu-
rity parameter). The advantage is between 0 and 1 for com-
putational problems, between 0 and 1/2 for distinguishable
problems3.
3.4 Model and Definitions
To setup a system, we define two general algorithms:
• GenerateIdentifier() → E: to generate a random,
new and suitable identifier for an entity E within the
logging scheme.
• SetupEntity(L,E): to setup the state at the log server
L for entity E.
Without loss of generality, we assume a single data proces-
sor P and a single log server L. The data processor has
been initialised at the log server, SetupEntity(L,P) was
executed. Users are added dynamically by the adversary.
The log server maintains a state for the data processor and
every user. The entire log is accessible to the adversary at
all times. Let A denote the adversary that can adaptively
control the system through a set of oracles:
• CreateUser(λ) → Ui, l: this oracle calls Generate-
Identifier → Ui and runs SetupEntity(L,Ui) to
setup the state for a new user at the log server. Given
the data λ an initial log entry l is created for Ui by call-
ing CreateEntry(Ui,λ). The generated user identifier
and log entry are returned.
• CreateEntry(U,λ)→ l: this oracle creates a log entry
l at log server L for data processor P and user U on
the data λ. The log entry is returned.
• CorruptLogServer()→ State,#entries: corrupt the
log server L, which returns the entire state of the log
server and the number of created log entries before
calling this oracle.
Note that, for properties with prefix forward (introduced
shortly), the adversary cannot invoke any further queries
after it makes a call to the CorruptLogServer oracle.
3The probability of guessing is already 1/2.
3.4.1 R1: Forward Integrity
We adopt the definitions of Bellare and Yee[6] for for-
ward integrity (FI) and deletion-detection FI secure logging
schemes. FI captures that at the time of comprising the log
server, no log entries before that time can be forged without
being detected. To ensure that no modifications to the log
prior to compromise of the log server can be made, trunca-
tion attacks4 also need to be taken into account. For this
reason deletion-detection FI is required.
First we define what constitutes a valid log entry: valid(l, i)
returns whether or not the full log trail for every user verifies
when li (the log entry created at the i-th call of CreateEn-
try) is replaced by l. Now, we are ready to present the
experiment that the challenger sets up for A attacking the
forward integrity (FI):
ExpFIA (k):
1. l← ACreateUser,CreateEntry,CorruptLogServer()
2. Return ∃ i ≤ #entries : l 6= li ∧ valid(l, i).
The advantage of the adversary is defined as
AdvFIA (k) = Pr
[
ExpFIA (k) = 1
]
.
Definition 1. A logging system provides computational
forward integrity, if and only if for all polynomial time ad-
versaries A, it holds that AdvFIA (k) ≤ (k).
Definition 2. A logging system provides computational
deletion-detection forward integrity, if and only if it is FI
secure and the log verifier can determine, given the output
of the log system and the time of compromise, whether any
prior log entries have been deleted.
3.4.2 R2: Secrecy
The adversary A aiming to compromise the secrecy of the
data contained within the log entries (SE), has to guess the
bit b, for the modified CreateEntry oracle:
• CreateEntry(U,λ0, λ1)b → l: this oracle creates a log
entry l at log server L for data processor P and user U
on the data λb. The log entry is returned.
ExpSEA (k):
1. b ∈R {0, 1}
2. g ← ACreateUser,CreateEntry,CorruptLogServer()
3. Return g
?
= b.
The advantage of the adversary is defined as
AdvSEA (k) =
1
2
·
∣∣∣Pr [ExpSEA (k) = 1|b = 0]+
Pr
[
ExpSEA (k) = 1|b = 1
]
− 1
∣∣∣ .
Definition 3. A logging system provides computational
secrecy of the data contained within the log entries, if and
only if for all polynomial time adversaries A, it holds that
AdvSEA (k) ≤ (k).
4A truncation attack is when an attacker deletes a continu-
ous subset of log entries at the end of a log, see e.g. [13].
3.4.3 R3: Forward Unlinkability of User Log Entries
The goal of the adversary A attacking the forward unlink-
ability of user log entries (FU) is to guess the bit b, for the
modified CreateEntry oracle:
• DrawUser(Ui,Uj) → vuser: this oracle generates a
virtual user reference, as a monotonic counter, vuser
and stores (vuser,Ui,Uj) in a table D. If Ui is already
referenced as the left-side user in D or Uj as the right-
side user, then this oracle returns ⊥ and adds no entry
to D. Otherwise, it returns vuser.
• Free(vuser): this oracle removes the triple (vuser,Ui,Uj)
from table D.
• CreateEntry(vuser,λ)b → l: from the table D, this
oracle retrieves the corresponding (Ui,Uj). Depending
on the value of b, vuser either refers to Ui or Uj . A
log entry l is created at log server L for data processor
P and user Ui (if b = 0) or Uj (if b = 1) on the data
λ. The log entry is returned.
Note that logging a message for a specific user Ui is still
possible. This is required for the CreateUser oracle, that
needs to log a message for the created user. By calling
DrawUser(Ui,Ui) → vuser, vuser refers to Ui, regardless
of the bit b.
ExpFUA (k):
1. b ∈R {0, 1}
2. g ← ACreateUser,DrawUser,Free,CreateEntry,CorruptLogServer()
3. Return g
?
= b.
The advantage of the adversary is defined as
AdvFUA (k) =
1
2
·
∣∣∣Pr [ExpFUA (k) = 1|b = 0]+
Pr
[
ExpFUA (k) = 1|b = 1
]
− 1
∣∣∣ .
Definition 4. A logging system provides computational
forward unlinkability of user log entries, if and only if for all
polynomial time adversaries A, it holds that AdvFUA (k) ≤ (k).
3.4.4 R4: Unlinkability of User Identifiers
This property implies multiple data processors, hence the
oracles CreateUser and CreateEntry need to be made data
processor dependent. Without loss of generality, we can
still assume that there is a single log server and that all
data processors have been initialised at this log server. An
attacker against Unlinkability of User Identifiers (UU) has
to guess the bit b, used in the Fork oracle:
• Fork(U,P0,P1)b → U′, l: for a user U setup with data
processor P0, this oracle constructs U
′ either by ran-
domising U(b = 0) or by generating a new identifier
by calling GenerateIdentifier() (b = 1). Next, U′
is setup for P1 at log server L. The resulting data,
together with the data used to randomise the identi-
fier (b = 0) or random data of equal length (b = 1),
is logged for user U and data processor P0. The new
user and log entry is returned.
ExpUUA (k):
1. b ∈R {0, 1}
2. g ← ACreateUser,CreateEntry,Fork,CorruptLogServer()
3. Return g
?
= b.
The advantage of the adversary is defined as
AdvUUA (k) =
1
2
·
∣∣∣Pr [ExpUUA (k) = 1|b = 0]+
Pr
[
ExpUUA (k) = 1|b = 1
]
− 1
∣∣∣ .
Definition 5. A logging system provides computational
unlinkability of user identifiers, if and only if for all polyno-
mial time adversaries A, it holds that AdvUUA (k) ≤ (k).
4. OUR SCHEME
This section describes our proposed scheme. First, we ex-
plain the idea behind the log entry structure and the state
kept at the log server. Then, we introduce the required cryp-
tographic building blocks. Finally, we describe the compo-
nents of our proposal in detail.
4.1 Log Entry Structure and State
A log entry is created by a log server for a user U when
the data processor P sends some data to log. A log entry
consists of five fields:
Data The data field contains the actual data to be logged in
an encrypted form, such that only the user can derive
the plaintext.
ICU The index chain field for the user serves as an identifier
for the log entry for the user. The values of this field
create a chain that links all log entries for the user
together. Only the user can reconstruct this chain.
DCU The data chain field for the user allows the user to
verify the validity of this log entry. All entries that
were created for this user are chained together, leading
to cumulative verification, i.e., verifying the integrity
of one log entry verifies all the previous log entries too.
ICP The index chain field for the data processor.
DCP The data chain for the data processor.
The data processor supplies the value that goes into the data
field, while the index chain fields are derived from the state
kept by the log server. The data chain fields are derived from
the state kept by the log server, the data field and index
fields from the log entry. A log server keeps the following
values in its state for each user and data processor:
AK The current authentication key, used as a key when
generating the DC field of the next log entry, and when
updating state after log entry creation.
IC An intermediate index chain value, used to generate the
next IC field of a log entry, derived from the IC field
of the previous log entry for this entity.
DC An intermediate data chain value, used to generate the
next DC field of a log entry, derived from the DC field
of the previous log entry for this entity.
The state is updated each time a log entry is created, mak-
ing it hard to recover the previous values stored in state.
This is the mechanism at the core of the prior to compro-
mise adversary model in our setting. Due to the fact that the
state kept by log servers is continuously updated as log en-
tries are created, the adversary is unable to reconstruct prior
states needed for manipulating log entries created prior to
compromise. Figure 4 illustrates the interplay between log
entries, the log server’s state, and our adversary model.
Statei+1 Create Entry
entryi+1
Statei Create Entry
data, IDU, IDP
entryi
compromise at time t
Statei+2
data, IDU, IDP
Figure 4: The interplay between log entries, the log
server’s state, and our adversary model.
4.2 Cryptographic Building Blocks
To provide forward integrity and forward unlinkability of
user identifiers, we make use of a cryptographic hash func-
tion H(·) and a cryptographic message authentication code
generation algorithm MACK(·) under a secret key K. Each
time a log entry is created the secret keyK used for the MAC
algorithm is evolved using the hash function. For the MAC
algorithm, we make use of the general HMAC construction.
In our scheme, the identifiers of entities are public keys
that can be used to encrypt messages for this entity. An en-
cryption scheme
∏
consists of three algorithms: GenerateKey(),
EncPK(p), and DecSK(c). GenerateKey() generates a new
random keypair (PK, SK) consisting of public key PK and
private key SK. EncPK(p) outputs the encryption of a plain-
text p with public key PK. DecSK(c) for a keypair (PK, SK),
outputs the plaintext p by decrypting the ciphertext c ←
EncPK(p). For our logging scheme to provide secrecy,
∏
should provide indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext
attack (IND-CPA) security [4]. Furthermore, for our logging
scheme to achieve forward unlinkability of user identifiers,
∏
should also be key private under chosen plaintext attack (IK-
CPA) [3]. For efficiency, a hybrid cipher with asymmetric
key encapsulation and symmetric data encapsulation mecha-
nism (KEM-DEM) [10] will be used. We selected the elliptic
curve integrated encryption scheme (ECIES) [21], as defined
in ISO/IEC 18033-2. User identifiers are generated as fol-
lows: GenerateKey()→ (PK, SK), where SK = x ∈R Zn
and PK = X = xG, for a generator G of the curve.
The data processor and log server have separate key pairs
used for signing purposes, in order to establish the origin
of messages. A signature scheme consists of three algo-
rithms: GenerateKey(), SignSK(m), and VerifyPK(σ,m).
GenerateKey() generates a random, new keypair (PK, SK).
SignSK(m) outputs a signature σ on message m using pri-
vate key SK. VerifyPK(σ,m) verifies that σ is a valid sig-
nature on m using the public key PK, and returns true if
the signature is valid, otherwise false. The signature scheme
should be non-repudiable and selectively unforgeable under
known message attack [8]. We selected ECDSA [14].
4.3 Setup and Stopping
Before a data processor can start logging data for users,
it needs to be set up at its log server. First the data pro-
cessor generates a key pair and uses the public key as its
identifier at its log server. The log server runs Algorithm 1
with the data processor’s public key as input and returns the
output to the data processor. This algorithm initialises the
log server’s state for the provided identifier and outputs the
initial authentication key (AK0) encrypted under this iden-
tifier. To guarantee the origin of the initial authentication
key, it is signed by the log server prior to encryption. The
data processor decrypts the output of the log server, verifies
the signature and stores AK0.
Algorithm 1 Setup of an entity at a log server.
Require: An entity identifier IDE.
Ensure: The encrypted initial values in State.
1: AK0 ← Rand(|H(·)|)
2: State(IDE, IC)← MACAK0 (IDE)
3: State(IDE, DC)← null
4: State(IDE, AK)← H(AK0)
5: return EncIDE
(
AK0, SignSKL (AK0, IDE)
)
To set up users, the user first generates a fresh user iden-
tifier as follows:
IDU ← PK ,with (PK, SK)← GenerateKey() (1)
Then, the user runs Protocol 1 to set up transparency log-
ging at the data processor. At the end of the protocol, the
user will be in possession of the initial authentication key,
and be assured that it was generated by the log server. This
initial authentication key will be used by the user to down-
load and verify all log entries related to him from the log
server, as described later in Section 4.6. The data proces-
sor keeps track of the association between the data that the
user disclosed and the user identifier IDU such that the data
processor can later log data processing for the correct user.
Protocol 1 Setup between user U and data processor P
with log server L.
Require: P is set up at L, user identifier IDU.
Ensure: User knowns AK0 for IDU.
1: U −→ P −→ L : IDU
2: L : α← EncIDU
(
AK0, SignSKL (AK0, IDU)
)
← Algorithm 1
with input IDU
3: L −→ P : α
4: P −→ U : α, SignSKP (α)
When a data processor has finished processing on a user’s
data, the data processor constructs one final log entry for
the user with the marker MS that signals to the user that
the data processor has finished its processing. We describe
how to create a log entry in Section 4.4. Next, the data
processor instructs the log server to delete the state kept for
that user from the log server.
4.4 Generating Log Entries
When a data processor performs processing on a user’s
disclosed data, it logs a description of the processing to the
log trail of the user located at the log server used by the data
processor as described in Protocol 2. The data processor
first signs the data to log (to prove the origin to the user)
and then encrypts the data and signature under the public
key of the user. Next, the data processor sends the resulting
ciphertext to the log server who creates a log entry.
Protocol 2 The generate log entry protocol for data pro-
cessor P with log server L.
Require: The processor identifier IDP, user identifier IDU, and
data λ to log.
Ensure: Log entry l created for IDU and IDP with data λ.
1: P: d← EncIDU
(
λ, SignSKP (λ)
)
2: P −→ L : IDP, IDU, d
3: L −→ P : l← Algorithm 2 with input IDP, IDU and d
The log server creates the log entry by running Algo-
rithm 2. First, the log entry is created (steps 1–5) and
written into storage (step 6). Next, the log server’s state
is updated for both the involved user and data processor
(steps 7–12). In the process of updating the state, any old
values are overwritten and no longer accessible afterwards.
At the end (step 13), the generated log entry is returned.
Algorithm 2 The algorithm for creating a log entry.
Require: Identifiers for a data processor IDP and a user IDU,
and the data d to log.
Ensure: Log entry created and stored.
1: ICU ← H
(
State(IDU, IC)
)
2: DCU ← MACState(IDU,AK)
(
State(IDU, DC), ICU, d
)
3: ICP ← H
(
State(IDP, IC)
)
4: DCP ← MACState(IDP,AK)
(
State(IDP, DC), ICP,
DCU, ICU, d
)
5: li ← (ICU, DCU, ICP, DCP, d)
6: Storage(ICU)← Storage(ICP)← li
7: State(IDU, IC)← MACState(IDU,AK)(ICU)
8: State(IDU, DC)← MACState(IDU,AK)(DCU)
9: State(IDU, AK)← H
(
State(IDU, AK)
)
10: State(IDP, IC)← MACState(IDP,AK)(ICP)
11: State(IDP, DC)← MACState(IDP,AK)(DCP)
12: State(IDP, AK)← H
(
State(IDP, AK)
)
13: return li
4.5 Forking a Process
When a data processor wishes to involve another data pro-
cessor in the processing of a user’s data, the transparency
logging needs to fork such that the data processing can be
made transparent to the user at the additional data proces-
sor. As part of forking, the public key used to identify the
user needs to be blinded, to prevent linking the transparency
logging on both data processors for the same user. Blinding
a public key X is done by generating a random integer r 6= 0
in Zn, and used to generate a new public key X ′ as follows:
X′ = X + rG = (x+ r)G (2)
The corresponding private key is x + r, which is easy to
compute when knowing both the original secret key x and
the blinding factor r.
Protocol 3 describes forking between two data processors,
the initiating (that wishes to fork the process) Pa and the
receiving Pb, that use log servers La and Lb respectively,
where La and Lb may or may not be the same log server.
First, Pa creates a blinded user identifier for the user using
Equation (2) (step 1). Next, this new user is set up with data
processor Pb and log server Lb, where Pa takes on the role of
the user in Protocol 1 (step 2). Finally (step 3), Pa creates
a special log entry at its log server La for IDU with Mf , a
forking marker indicating that a fork has taken place, r, the
information needed to generate the corresponding blinded
private key, and β, the encrypted initial authentication key
from the log server used by the receiving data processor.
The user IDU can later, with (Mf , r, β), reconstruct the log
trail for ID′U used by data processor Pb at log server Lb.
Protocol 3 The forking protocol between data processors
Pa and Pb with log servers La and Lb, respectively.
Require: The user identifier IDU.
Ensure: Forking information written to the log.
1: Pa : (ID′U, r)← Equation (2) with input IDU
2: Pa : β ← Protocol 1 with data processor Pb and its log server
Lb for user identifier ID
′
U
3: Pa : run Protocol 2 with La, for IDU with data λ = (Mf , r, β)
4.6 Reconstruction
When the user disclosed data to the data processor, the
user initiated Protocol 1, generating an identifier IDU in the
process, and getting an initial authentication key AK0 from
the data processor. To reconstruct the log trail, the user
first downloads all log entries, stored at the log server used
by this data processor, linked to his identifier IDU. Next,
the user validates the downloaded log trail.
Based on how a user is set up at the log server (Algo-
rithm 1), and how log entries are created (Algorithm 2), the
following equations describe how the user can generate the
index chain value of all the user’s log entries, for the i:th log
entry where i ≥ 1, given AK0 and IDU:
ICU1 = H
(
MACAK0 (IDU)
)
(3a)
AKi = H(AKi−1) (3b)
ICUi = H
(
MACAKi−1 (ICUi−1 )
)
(3c)
A log server will provide any log entry it stores that matches
a provided index chain value, so Equation (3) enables users
to download all of their log entries at a log server sequentially
until the response from the log server no longer contains any
data. The straightforward way for a user to sequentially
download log entries from a log server may reveal (i) the
order in which log entries were generated, and (ii) that log
entries belong to the same user, i.e., one can link log entries
together. Please note that user behaviour is not considered
in our model since the negatively effects to the unlinkability
properties of log entries also depend on the setting our sys-
tem is deployed in. Users can however limit these effects by
(i) randomising the order in which log entries are requested,
at the cost of introducing some requests for log entries not
yet created and (ii) waiting some time between each request
for a log entry. Furthermore, users can cache already down-
loaded log entries and it is assumed that log servers will be
serving multiple data processors and users at the same time.
Protocol 4 describes the necessary steps to verify the au-
thenticity of the log trail. First, the user verifies locally the
authenticity of the downloaded log entries (steps 1–9.) For
each entry, the MAC in the DCU field of the entry is com-
pared to the correct computed value (step 4), and the data
field of the entry is decrypted and then the signature of the
processor on the logged data is verified (steps 6–8). Next,
the user requests the ICU value stored in the log server’s
state for IDU (steps 10–14). The log server replies by send-
ing the ICU value (or, if it does not exist, indicating that
logging has stopped, a random value of equal length) en-
crypted under the provided identifier. By sending this value
encrypted, only the legitimate user will be able to learn the
current ICU value at the log server. This value is checked
against the last entry in the log trail (steps 15–18). This
interaction with the log server allows the user to detect dele-
tion of log entries generated for his identifier (prior to com-
promise of the log server).
Protocol 4 Verify the authenticity of a log trail at log server
L for user IDU.
Require: The user’s identifier IDU, corresponding private key
SKU, initial authentication key AK0, list of log entries log,
and the data processor’s public key PKP for signature verifi-
cation.
Ensure: True if the log trail in log is valid, false otherwise.
1: index = 0, key ← AK0, chain← null
2: while index < |log| do
3: e← log[index], key ← H(key)
4: if e.DCU 6= MACkey(chain, e.ICU, e.Data) then
5: return false
6: (m,σ = SignSKP (m))← DecSKU (e.Data)
7: if VerifyPKP (σ,m) 6= true then
8: return false
9: chain← MACkey(e.DCU), index+ +
10: U −→ L : IDU
11: if L : State(IDU, IC) 6= null then
12: L −→ U : r ← EncIDU
(
State(IDU, IC)
)
13: else
14: L −→ U : r ← EncIDU
(
Rand(|MAC(·)|)
)
15: if m contains marker Ms then
16: return DecSKU (r) 6= MACkey(e.ICU)
17: else
18: return DecSKU (r)
?
= MACkey(e.ICU)
After verification of the log trail, the user searches for any
entries with the forking marker Mf . For each such entry, the
user uses his private key SK and together with the blinding
factor r from the log entry to construct the blinded private
key SK′ as described in Section 4.5. With the blinded pri-
vate key, the user can decrypt the additional payload of the
log entry (see Protocol 3) and recover the initial authentica-
tion key AK′0 for the forked process. With this information,
the user repeats the procedure outlined in this section to
reconstruct the rest of the log trail.
Note that a data processor could also retrieve all its cre-
ated log entries from its log server using a similar approach
as described in this section, and verify the integrity of all
data by computing the data chain for the data processor.
5. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our scheme with respect to
the security and privacy properties defined in Section 3.4.
5.1 R1: Forward Integrity
Theorem 1. The proposed logging scheme provides com-
putational forward integrity, according to Definition 1.
Proof. This follows directly from the proof of Theorem
3.2 by Bellare et al. [5]. They showed that for a standard
message authentication scheme and a forward secure pseudo-
random generator, the general construction of a key-evolving
message authentication scheme is forward secure.
Theorem 2. The proposed logging scheme provides com-
putational deletion-detection forward integrity, according to
Definition 2.
Proof. First, the scheme provides computational for-
ward integrity. Second, we will show that user can detect
if log entries in his trail are deleted. We have to differ-
entiate between two cases: (1) the logging for this user
has ended and (2) the logging for this user is still ongo-
ing. In the first case the user will be able to validate its
entire log trail until the last entry containing a stopping
marker. In absence of this marker in the last log entry, the
user will assume to be in the second case and ask the log
server for the current State(IDU, IC) value. This value is
encrypted under the user’s public key. Hence, this mech-
anism only allows the legitimate user to learn this value.
Now we need to show that a corrupted log server cannot
produce a previous State(IDU, IC) value, given the current
state and all log entries. For an adversary to truncate the
log entries for a certain user U given the last entry for this
user to retain, ICUlast , and the first entry for this user af-
ter that, ICUtruncated , this adversary has to come up with
Statelast(IDU, IC) that follows ICUlast . The following re-
lations exist:
• Statelast(IDU, IC) = MACStatelast(IDU,AK)(ICUlast) and
• ICUtruncated = H(Statelast(IDU, IC)).
Given the one-way nature of the hash function and non-
malleability of the MAC algorithm, the advantage of an adver-
sary for creating a valid Statelast(IDU, IC) is negligible.
5.2 R2: Secrecy
Theorem 3. Under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)
assumption, the proposed logging scheme provides computa-
tional secrecy of the data contained within the log entries,
according to Definition 3.
Proof. The data field in the log entry, for a user U and
data λb, is d = EncIDU
(
λb, SignSKP(λb)
)
. For an adver-
sary to distinguish between λ0 and λ1 being logged, an-
other adversary with the same success probability can be
constructed, breaking the IND-CPA security of the encryp-
tion scheme Enc. For the used ECIES encryption scheme,
this probability is negligible under the DDH assumption.
5.3 R3: Forward Unlinkability of User Log
Entries
Theorem 4. In the random oracle model, under the DDH
assumption, the proposed logging scheme provides computa-
tional forward unlinkability of user log entries, according to
Definition 4.
We only provide a sketch of the proof. The full proof is given
in Appendix A.
Proof sketch. A game-based proof technique proposed
by Shoup [20] is used. First, the encryption of the data λ
and the signature on it by the data processor for a specific
user is replaced by an encryption of this data and signature
under a randomised public key. This is possible, given that
the encryption scheme provides key privacy under chosen
plaintext attack (IK-CPA) [3]. For the used ECIES encryp-
tion scheme, the advantage of a distinguisher is equal to
the DDH advantage. Second, all instantiations of the hash
function (also within the MAC algorithm since we make use
of HMAC) are replaced by a random oracle. Finally, we
replace everything by true random values. The obtained
advantage of the adversary is smaller than the sum of the
DDH advantage and the birthday paradox bound, which is
negligible.
5.4 R4: Unlinkability of User Identifiers
Theorem 5. Under the DDH assumption, the proposed
logging scheme provides computational forward unlinkability
of user identifiers, according to Definition 5.
We only provide a sketch of the proof. The full proof is given
in Appendix B.
Proof sketch. First, we show that the distribution of
the randomised user identifiers is equal to the distribution
of user identifiers. Second, we will show by reduction that
there exists no adversary against the unlinkability of user
identifiers under the DDH assumption.
6. EFFICIENCY
We implemented a prototype of our scheme in the pro-
gramming language Go [1], with the cryptographic primi-
tives ECIES and ECDSA on NIST P-256, SHA-256, and
HMAC using SHA-256. All benchmarks are performed on a
laptop running a GNU/Linux based x64 OS with an Intel i5
(quad core 2.6GHz) CPU and 7.7 GB DDR3 RAM. Table 1
provides a benchmark of the algorithms and protocols that
make up our scheme, done by Go’s built-in benchmarking
functionality, which will run a test until it is“timed reliably”.
The benchmark shows that operations related to encryption
and signatures are the main bottlenecks. As a consequence,
data processors perform the bulk of the work. Decryption
and verification for users are relatively costly. However, in
practice, downloading the log entries over an anonymous
channel (such as that provided by Tor [7]) possibly with
an imposed waiting time, as discussed in Section 4.6, will
most likely cause the bottleneck. For log servers, creating
log entries is fast, while setup (also part of forking) is costly.
Presumably, setup will be relatively infrequent.
Table 1: Benchmark of algorithms and protocols.
Algorithm/Protocol Time [ms] Comments
Algorithm 1: Setup Entity 14,8
Protocol 1: Setup U,L,P 25,0
Algorithm 2: Create Log Entry 0,1 1 KiB data
Protocol 2: Generate Log Entry 15,0 1 KiB data
Protocol 3: Forking 45,3
Protocol 4: Verify 180,2 10 entries of 1 KiB data
To get a better idea of how our scheme would perform in
practice as a deployed system, we extended our implemen-
tation. First, we transformed the data processor to a stan-
dalone service (similar to a Syslog server) to which other
systems at the data processor send messages that should be
logged. The data processor and log server provide REST-
ful APIs over HTTPS. TLS is provided with the cipher
suite ECDHE/RSA/AES/256/CBC/SHA, where the 2048-
bit RSA keys are pre-shared. Next, we introduced the con-
cept of transactions, analogous to transactions in relational
databases. At a data processor, starting a transaction cre-
ates a new buffer for user-message pairs. A transaction can
then be committed, which takes all user-message pairs in
the buffer and creates log entries of them as described in
our scheme. At a log server, a transaction buffer works in a
similar way: a data processor can create a buffer of index-
user-message triplets that when committed gets added as log
entries at the log server, in the order of their indices. This
index is needed because our scheme requires that the order of
log entries is preserved. In return, this means that the data
processor can easily send index-user-message triplets in par-
allel to the log server. For the transaction buffers at a data
processor we also added support for parallelism. When a
data processor has received a user-message pair, the proces-
sor spawns a new Go routine (similar to a lightweight thread)
that performs the signing and encryption of the message in
the background. This allows the data processor to quickly
let other systems at the data processor return to their pri-
mary work of data processing, and the data processor service
can perform the heavy computations while waiting for the
transaction to be committed.
Figure 5 shows the average time (in milliseconds) for gen-
erating a log entry depending on the number of entries in
each transaction and the size of the data to be logged for
each entry. Each entry was logged for a random user that
was set up before the start of the experiment. The log
server, the data processor, and the application calling the
data processor API were run both locally (L) and remotely
(R). The local experiment was run on the above described
setup. For the remote experiment, the log server was run at
Amazon and the data processor in a private cloud at Karl-
stad University in Sweden. The application calling the data
processor API was run on the same laptop as used previ-
ously connected to the same university network as the data
processor. The Amazon EC2 instance was an M1 Medium
instance with 2 ECUs (EC2 Compute Unit), 1 core, and 3.7
GiB of memory. It was hosted in the eu-west-1c zone and ran
Ubuntu GNU/Linux 12.10 x64. The private cloud instance
was a VMware Ubuntu GNU/Linux 12.04 x64 instance with
access to a quad core Intel Xeon E5540 CPU and 4 GiB of
memory. We used the Linux ping command to measure the
latency between 1) the data processor and the Amazon EC2
instance: on average 45.7 ms with a standard deviation of
0.3 ms, and 2) the laptop and the data processor: on average
1.19 ms with a standard deviation of 0.09 ms.
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Figure 5: The average time (ms), in a local (L) and
remote (R) setting, for generating a log entry de-
pending on the number of log entries per transaction
and the size of the data to be logged.
The experiment in Figure 5 clearly shows that a modest
transaction size significantly lowers the average log entry
generation time. At around 20 entries per transaction, the
benefit of adding more entries to a transaction diminishes.
The average log entry time does not scale linearly with the
size of the logged data. This is mainly due to the fact that
the data to be logged is first signed and then encrypted be-
fore being sent to the log server. The relative overhead for
the signature and public-key encryption is larger for smaller
log entries. In the local setting, the difference between gen-
erating a log entry with 1 KiB and 100 KiB of data is roughly
13 ms at 50 entries per transaction, resulting in about double
the average log entry generation time for logging 100 times
more data. In the remote setting, logging 100 KiB of data
per entry takes roughly 3 times as long as logging 1 KiB of
data. We suspect the increased time in the remote setting
is due to the increased latency, but further experiments are
needed. Table 2 shows the goodput, the throughput mea-
sured with respect to the data to be logged, for both the
local and remote setting at 100 log entries per transaction.
Table 2: Goodput at 100 log entries per transaction.
Data per log entry 1 KiB 10 KiB 100 KiB
Local setting 87 KiB/s 842 KiB/s 4149 KiB/s
Remote setting 52 KiB/s 497 KiB/s 1525 KiB/s
7. CONCLUSIONS
We introduced a new privacy-preserving transparency-en-
hancing tool. Our tool generates a log trail for a user, typ-
ically the subject of the process that is logged. Dynamic
and distributed processes can be logged, and the logging it-
self can also be distributed across several log servers. The
log entries are world-readable, but the strong cryptographic
properties of the underlying scheme ensure confidentiality
and unlinkability in a broad sense. Moreover, we are the first
to formalise these properties in a general way, enabling us
to prove that our scheme meets the necessary requirements.
We also implemented our scheme in a robust prototype im-
plementation and the first timing results show that the tool
can be used in practice.
In the setting of our work, having some initial trust in
data processors is unavoidable. However, log servers should
not initially have to be trusted. This can be realised in
part by introducing trusted hardware at the log server. In-
teresting future work is to improve on the design of such a
hardware extension, based upon e.g. the work of Vliegen et
al. [23], for our scheme. Another venue for future work is
to investigate suitable faster encryption and signature prim-
itives, since those operations account for the majority of the
computation as shown in Section 6.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOF OF FORWARD UNLINKABIL-
ITY OF USER LOG ENTRIES
Theorem 4. In the random oracle model, under the DDH
assumption, the proposed logging scheme provides computa-
tional forward unlinkability of user log entries, according to
Definition 4.
Proof. We use the game based proof technique proposed
by Shoup [20]. The initial game corresponds to the proposed
scheme. Only the differences with the previous game are
explicitly mentioned.
• Game 0:
– CreateUser(λ) creates a new user Ui and logs the
first data λ for that user as follows:
∗ Ui ← PK← GenerateKey()
∗ AK0 ← Rand(|H(·)|)
∗ State(IDUi , IC)← MACAK0
(
IDUi
)
∗ State(IDUi , DC)← null
∗ State(IDUi , AK)← H(AK0)
∗ DrawUser(Ui,Ui) → vuser
∗ CreateEntry(vuser,λ)→ l, return Ui, l.
– CreateEntry(vuser,λ) creates a log entry l at log
server L for data processor P and user U for given
data λ as follows:
∗ (vuser,Ui,Uj) ← D, U = Ui (if b = 0) or
U = Uj (if b = 1)
∗ d = EncPKU
(
λ, SignSKP(λ)
)
∗ ICU ← H
(
State(IDU, IC)
)
∗ DCU ← MACState(IDU,AK)
(
State(IDU, DC),
ICU, d
)
∗ ICP ← H
(
State(IDP, IC)
)
∗ DCP ← MACState(IDP,AK)
(
State(IDP, DC),
ICP, DCU, ICU, d
)
∗ State(IDU, IC)← MACState(IDU,AK)(ICU)
∗ State(IDU, DC)← MACState(IDU,AK)(DCU)
∗ State(IDU, AK)← H
(
State(IDU, AK)
)
∗ State(IDP, IC)← MACState(IDP,AK)(ICP)
∗ State(IDP, DC)← MACState(IDP,AK)(DCP)
∗ State(IDP, AK)← H
(
State(IDP, AK)
)
∗ Storage← l← (ICU, DCU, ICP, DCP, d)
∗ return l.
– CorruptLogServer() returns State(IDP, AK),
State(IDP, IC), State(IDP, DC) and ∀Ui:
State(IDUi , AK), State(IDUi , IC), State(IDUi , DC).
– Output of the experiment: g ← A.
The event Si is defined as A outputting a correct guess in
game i, i.e. g
?
= b.
Pr [S0] = 1/2 ·
(
Pr
[
Exp0A(k) = 1
]
+ Pr
[
Exp1A(k) = 1
])
• Game 1: The encryption of the data and signature on
it is done under a random encryption key.
– CreateEntry(vuser,λ):
∗ d = EncPKR
(
λ, SignSKP(λ)
)
with
PKR ← GenerateKey()
The difference |Pr [S0]− Pr [S1]| is the advantage of key pri-
vacy under chosen plaintext attack (IK-CPA) [3] of a distin-
guisher. For the used ECIES encryption scheme, this ad-
vantage is equal to the DDH advantage.
• Game 2: The random oracleORO(·) is used to replace
the outputs of the hash function by random values. The
MACK(m) algorithm in our proposed scheme is instan-
tiated with HMAC(K,m) = H
(
(K ⊕ opad)||H
(
(K ⊕
ipad)||m
))
.
– CreateUser(λ):
∗ State(IDUi , IC)← ORO
(
(AK0⊕
opad)||ORO
(
(AK0 ⊕ ipad)||IDUi
))
∗ State(IDUi , AK)← ORO
(
State(IDUi , AK)
)
– CreateEntry(vuser,λ):
∗ ICU ← ORO
(
State(IDU, IC)
)
∗ DCU ← ORO
(
(State(IDU, AK)⊕
opad)||ORO(. . .)
)
∗ ICP ← ORO
(
State(IDP, IC)
)
∗ DCP ← ORO
(
(State(IDP, AK)⊕
opad)||ORO(. . .)
)
∗ State(IDU, IC)← ORO
(
(State(IDU, AK)⊕
opad)||ORO(. . .)
)
∗ State(IDU, DC)← ORO
(
(State(IDU, AK)⊕
opad)||ORO(. . .)
)
∗ State(IDU, AK)← ORO
(
State(IDP, AK)
)
∗ State(IDP, IC)← ORO
(
(State(IDP, AK)⊕
opad)||ORO(. . .)
)
∗ State(IDP, DC)← ORO
(
(State(IDP, AK)⊕
opad)||ORO(. . .)
)
∗ State(IDP, AK)← ORO
(
State(IDU, AK)
)
Since we are in the random oracle model, Pr [S2] = Pr [S1].
• Game 3: The state is only generated when the Cor-
ruptLogServer oracle is called. The IC and DC fields
of the log entries are generated at random.
– CreateUser(λ):
∗ Ui ← PK← GenerateKey()
∗ DrawUser(Ui,Ui) → vuser
∗ CreateEntry(vuser,λ)→ l, return Ui, l.
– CreateEntry(vuser,λ):
∗ d = EncPKR
(
λ, SignSKP(λ)
)
with
PKR ← GenerateKey()
∗ ICU ← Rand(|H(·)|)
∗ DCU ← Rand(|H(·)|)
∗ ICP ← Rand(|H(·)|)
∗ DCP ← Rand(|H(·)|)
∗ Storage ← l ← (ICU, DCU, ICP, DCP, d), re-
turn l.
– CorruptLogServer:
∗ ∀Ui :
· State(IDUi , IC)← Rand(|H(·)|)
· State(IDUi , DC)← Rand(|H(·)|)
· State(IDUi , AK)← Rand(|H(·)|)
· return State(IDUi , AK), State(IDUi , IC),
State(IDUi , DC)
∗ State(IDP, IC)← Rand(|H(·)|)
∗ State(IDP, DC)← Rand(|H(·)|)
∗ State(IDP, AK)← Rand(|H(·)|)
∗ return State(IDP, AK), State(IDP, IC),
State(IDP, DC)
In this game, the adversary has no possible way to detect
any relation between log entries. Hence, the probability of
success is equal to guessing Pr [S3] = 1/2. For this step,
the output of the random oracle needs to be uniformly dis-
tributed. Hence, the corresponding input need to be dif-
ferent from all previous ones. In each instantiation of the
ORO(·), at least part of the input is truly random or the
output of the random oracle. Furthermore, the adversary
has no direct input to the random oracle, the data λ is put
through a randomised encryption with a randomised public
key. We obtain the following bound by using the birthday
paradox:
|Pr [S3]− Pr [S2]| ≤ 1− (n− 1)!
(n− 1− q)!(n− 1)q
with n = 2|H(·)| and q the number of queries made to the
random oracle.
• Conclusion:
The following advantage for an adversary against future un-
linkability of log entries is obtained for our scheme:
AdvFUA (k) =
1
2
·
∣∣∣Pr [ExpFUA (k) = 1|b = 0]+
Pr
[
ExpFUA (k) = 1|b = 1
]
− 1
∣∣∣
= |Pr [S0]− Pr [S3]|
= |Pr [S0]− Pr [S1] + Pr [S2]− Pr [S3]|
≤ |Pr [S0]− Pr [S1]|+ |Pr [S2]− Pr [S3]|
≤ AdvDDH(k) + 1− (n− 1)!
(n− 1− q)!(n− 1)q .
In the random oracle model, under the DDH assumption,
this advantage is negligible.
B. PROOF OF UNLINKABILITY OF USER
IDENTIFIERS
Theorem 5. Under the DDH assumption, the proposed
logging scheme provides computational forward unlinkability
of user identifiers, according to Definition 5.
Proof. First, we will show that the distribution of the
randomised user identifiers is equal to the distribution of
user identifiers, uniformly at random. User identifiers are
generated by GenerateKey()→ SK,PK, where SK = x is
chosen uniformly at random modulo n and PK = X = xG,
for G a generator of the underlying curve. A blinded key
is generated as follows: X ′ = X + rG = (x + r)G, with r
uniformly chosen at random modulo n. The distribution of
(x + r) is also uniformly at random modulo n, since x and
r are independent.
Second, we will show by reduction that there exists no ad-
versary against the unlinkability of user identifiers. Assume
an adversary A with non-negligible probability of success in
determining whether or not 〈IDU, ID′U, d← l〉 is a valid tu-
ple, i.e. of the form 〈x1G, x2G, EncX1
(
Mf , x2 − x1, . . .
)
〉.
The used encryption scheme is ECIES, for which the ci-
phertext (R, c,m) of a plaintext p under public key X is
computed as follows:
R = rG c = ENCK0(p) m = MACK1(c), with r ∈R Zn and
K0||K1 = KDF
(
xcoord(rX)
)
.
Given this adversaryA, another adversary can be constructed
against an instance of the DDH problem: given 〈A = aG,B =
bG,C〉, determine whether or not C = abG. For a valid DDH
tuple, A will have a non-negligible advantage when given
the following: for t ∈R Zn, 〈A,A + tG, EncA
(
Mf , t, . . .
)
〉,
where for the encryption we use rG = B and K0||K1 =
KDF
(
xcoord(C)
)
. If the DDH tuple was not valid, A can
only guess and has probability of 1/2 to win the game.
